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Introduction
What, if any, is the information contained in dividend changes? Theoretical models by Bhattacharya (1979) , Miller and Rock (1985) , and John and Williams (1985) tell us that changes in dividend policy convey news about future cash flows; specifically, dividend increases convey good news and dividend decreases convey bad news. The models also predict a positive relationship between dividend changes and the price reaction to dividend changes. Empirical evidence strongly supports the latter prediction and has been widely used to justify the theory. 1 One of the key implications of these models is that dividend changes should be followed by changes in profitability (earnings growth rate or return on assets) in the same direction.
2 Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) test this implication in a recent paper and find that the earnings growth rate of firms that increase dividends does not subsequently increase. Firms that decrease dividends, on the other hand, experience significant increases in earnings growth rates in the two years following the dividend decrease.
3 This evidence contradicts the central supposition of dividend information/signaling models; namely, that dividend changes signal changes in profitability in the same direction.
The price reaction to dividend increases and dividend decreases suggests that investors interpret these changes as positive and negative news, respectively, about the firm. However, if the positive or negative news is not about changes in future profitability, what else can it be? Or is the market reaction evidence of some kind of irrational exuberance? Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997, henceforth BMT) summarize their empirical findings this way: "…this implies that if firms are sending a signal, (a) it is not a signal about future earnings growth and (b) the market doesn't "get it." Why firms would burn money to send a signal that is not received is, indeed, a 1 See Asquith and Mullins (1983) , Brickley (1983) , and Healy and Palepu (1988) among many others.
2 See the survey on dividend policy by Allen and Michaely (1995) . 3 In earlier work, Watts (1973) and Gonedes (1978) find some weak evidence earnings increases following dividend decreases. Penman (1983) , however, finds that dividends convey no incremental information controlling for the effects of management earning forecasts.
While the vast majority of the theoretical and empirical research has assumed that firms use dividend changes to signal changes in future earnings or cash flows, there is another possibility; namely, increases in dividends convey information about changes in risk. By definition, fundamental news about a firm has to be either about its cash flows or about its discount rates (risk characteristics). If the good news in a dividend increase is not about (expected) increases in future earnings, it may be about a decline in (systematic) risk. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the relation between dividend changes and changes in future risk characteristics of a firm.
We find that dividend increasing firms not only experience a reduction in profitability but also a reduction in risk. 4 None of the existing theories of dividend policy can explain these results satisfactorily.
Both dividend-signaling models and the free cash flow hypothesis (Easterbrook (1984 ), Jensen (1986 and Stulz (1988) ) have very little to say about the relationship between dividend changes and risk changes. Therefore, we propose an alternate explanation that we refer to as the maturity hypothesis. We argue that there are several elements to a firm becoming mature. As firms become mature, their investment opportunity set shrinks, resulting in a decline in their future profitability.
But perhaps the most important consequence of a firm becoming mature is a change in its (systematic) risk characteristics, specifically, a decline in risk. The decline in risk occurs most likely because the firm's assets in place have become less risky and/or the firm has fewer growth opportunities available. Finally, the decline in investment opportunities generates an increase in free cash flows leading to an increase in dividends. 5 Thus, a dividend increase indicates that a firm has matured. 4 Any unqualified reference to risk henceforth is to "systematic risk." In Section 2 we precisely define our risk measurements.
5 A dividend increase may also serve as a monitoring device as in the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) .
The Free Cash Flow hypothesis has very appealing features, and captures an important aspect of firm valuation --the conflict of interest between management and shareholders --which may explain why a mature firm increases dividends. However, this hypothesis by itself cannot explain existing evidence. Specifically, it cannot explain changes in risk characteristics that we document in this paper. In addition, the interaction between information asymmetry and conflict of interest is not captured by the hypothesis. The maturity hypothesis attempts to capture some of the effects of both information asymmetry and agency conflicts.
The above discussion suggests that when analyzing the evolution of a firm subsequent to a dividend increase, one should look not only at changes in the numerator (change in cash flows) but also at changes in the denominator (the discount rate or the cost of capital). While the first effect (lower earnings growth or return on assets) will tend to reduce firm value, the second effect (lower cost of capital) will have the tendency to increase its value. Therefore, any attempt to explain the price reaction to dividend changes has to rely at least partially on the risk effect. An additional explanation for the price increase accompanying a dividend increase announcement may be the anticipated reduction in the agency costs of free cash flows. Thus the maturity hypothesis gives rise to the following testable implications: (a) Firm's risk should decline in the period after the dividend increase, (b) Profitability (return on assets or earnings growth) of a firm should decline following a dividend increase, and (c) Capital expenditures should decline following a dividend (due to the decline in investment opportunities).
Using a sample of large dividend changes (a change greater than 12%) that were announced between 1982 and 1993 (2,576 dividend change announcements) we find results that are consistent with the maturity hypothesis. Firms that increase dividends not only experience a decline in profitability (consistent with BMT), but also a decline in their risk and capital expenditures (as a proportion of total assets). 6 In fact, firms that increase dividends the most experience the greatest decline in risk. Examining the change in debt ratings, we provide further evidence in support of risk changes accompanying dividend changes. We show that the decline in firm's risk manifests itself not only through the reduction in the systematic risk of equity but also through improvement in the firm's debt ratings. These firms also experience the largest decline in profitability and capital expenditures. Finally, we show that the market reaction to a dividend increase is negatively related to changes in profitability and risk. Thus, in response to a dividend increase stock price increases in anticipation of a decline in the firm's systematic risk and (hence) its cost of capital during the three years subsequent to the dividend increase.
Multivariate tests based on the initial price reaction to dividend changes indicate that the market understands, at least to some extent, the implication of a change in dividend policy for the subsequent change in a firm's riskiness. The positive announcement period returns are accompanied by a decrease in systematic risk of the firm while negative announcement period returns are accompanied by an increase in the systematic risk. The greater the subsequent decline in risk, the more positive the market reaction to the announced dividend. Thus, changes in risk, conditional on changes in profitability, begin to provide an explanation for the price reaction to dividend announcements.
However, the finding that there is a negative relation between announcement day returns and future changes in profitability is troubling since it suggests that investors reward and anticipated decline in future profitability with a more positive price reaction. Furthermore, the discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that investors are able to extract information about future risk changes from the announcement of a dividend increase. This raises two questions: (a)
are investors sophisticated enough to extract the full impact of future risk changes from announcements of dividend changes, and (b) why is the initial price reaction more positive the larger the decline in profitability?
The evidence on long-term price reaction to dividend changes may provide answers to these questions. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) and Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find that prices of dividend increasing firms (after benchmark adjustments) continue to drift upward gradually over the next three years while the prices of dividend decreasing firms continue to drift downward. Using multivariate regression tests, we show that the drift is positively related to future changes in profitability and negatively related to future changes in risk.
Thus, in the long run, prices conditionally, decrease with a decline in profitability, and increase with a decline in risk. This price behavior is consistent with a security market in which investors gradually learn the full implications of a dividend change for a firm's future profitability and risk characteristics.
Perhaps, this learning is done as other confirming events unfold. Indeed, we present evidence that: (1) earnings surprises in the two years after a dividend increase are negative (i.e., investors learn that they were over-optimistic about earnings), and (2) in the years following a dividend increase, a firm's bond ratings significantly improve (i.e., investors learn that the firm's risk is lower than it has been). These two pieces of evidence are important for other reasons as well. First it shows that the positive drift is not driven by positive earning surprises, confirming our evidence that earnings following a dividend increase are lower than expected. Second, the increase in debt rating is another manifestation that the firm riskiness has indeed declined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the maturity hypothesis in more details. Section 3 describes the data, the definition of the data variables used in the paper, and summary statistics on the data variables. Section 4 provides results on future changes in risk and profitability. Section 5 establishes the link between the informational role of dividends and future changes in risk and profitability, and Section 6 concludes.
The Maturity Hypothesis and its Implications
The market value of a firm can be broken down into the value from assets in place and the value from future growth opportunities or growth options. The value from growth options represents the value of future investments that are expected to provide returns well in excess of their cost of capital. 7 Typically, for a growth firm, a major portion of the firm value (sometimes even more than 100% of the value) can be attributed to growth options. As the growth firm becomes mature, the proportion of value attributable to growth options declines. In other words, the number of positive NPV projects available to the firm declines. Consequently, the firm's return on investment (return on equity or return on assets) declines and so does its economic profits. In turn, a decline in return on investment, all else equal, reduces the rate of growth of cash flows of the firm.
How does this maturation process affect the systematic risk of the firm? For ease of exposition, let us assume that the CAPM beta is a good proxy of the firm's systematic risk and that the firm is an all-equity firm. Then, the firm's equity beta is a weighted average of the beta of 7 A firm is not a growth firm just because its sales, earnings or assets are growing rapidly. A firm is a growth firm only if its growth is accompanied by the fact that its return on investment is significantly greater than its cost of capital. In other words, the firm has to generate significant economic profits or economic value added (EVA) to be classified as a growth firm. Growth in sales or earnings unaccompanied by economic profits will not increase value and on many occasions may actually destroy value. For instance, it is easy to show using the Gordon growth model that if cost of equity is equal to ROE, the value of a firm growing at a constant rate (regardless of the growth rate) is simply the present value of a constant perpetuity.
its assets in place and the beta of its growth options where the weights are based on the relative values of assets in place and growth options. Since most growth options have call option characteristics, it follows that the growth option beta cannot be less than the beta of the underlying assets. 8 As the firm matures, and the number of growth options in its portfolio decreases, the weight put on the growth option beta will also decline. This will result in a decline in its overall beta. If in addition, the riskiness of the firm's assets in place also declines the firm's beta will decline even further. This can happen if the assets underlying the growth options become progressively less risky as the time-to-maturity of the growth options increases. In sum, this suggests that as a firm gets older it is likely to face investment opportunities that are less risky.
As the investment opportunities decline, the need for resources for new investments should also decline which is likely to result in a decline in capital expenditures. Thus, abstracting from agency conflicts, an increase in dividends may convey information to the market about the changing investment opportunity set, changing risk characteristics and the changing profitability of the firm. However, the potential for the management to over-invest is very high when a firm is going through a change in its life cycle. For instance, managers may continue to invest in less profitable projects in order to increase the resources under their control (see Jensen, 1986 ) despite the decline in the firm's investment opportunity set. Therefore, an increase in dividends may not only convey information about changes in the firm's fundamentals but also about the management's commitment not to over-invest. And the overall implication of an increase in dividends is that the firm has matured.
In summary, the maturity hypothesis has the following predictions for firms that increase dividends: a) Firms that increase their dividends will experience a decline in their systematic risk and, therefore, their cost of capital will also decline b) Firms that increase their dividends will experience a decline in their profitability.
c) Firms that increase their dividends will need less cash for investments, and therefore the level of capital expenditures will decline.
d) The payout ratios of firms that increase their dividends will permanently increase since an increase in dividend are unlikely to be accompanied by an equivalent increase in future earnings.
What According to the maturity hypothesis, firms increase dividends in the face of declining growth opportunities that lead to a decrease in the firm's systematic risk and profitability. What then should be the market reaction to a dividend increase? The dividend increase clearly contains at least two pieces of news. The good news is that the risk has decreased, and the bad news is that profits are going to decline. The positive market reaction implies that news about risk dominates news about profitability.
Another possibility is that investors treat dividend increase as good news, in spite of the declining profitability, because of agency considerations. For instance, if investors expect managers to squander their wealth through over-investment, then a dividend increase suggests that managers are likely to act more responsibly. Thus in addition to the good news conveyed about a risk reduction, investors may interpret a dividend increase as good news per se (they reduce the over-investment problem), and the stock price would rise.
The maturity hypothesis does not have much to say about the long-term price reaction to dividend changes. However, it is reasonable to suppose that in a market with information asymmetry that investors would learn only gradually the full implications of a dividend increase announcement for the future profitability and risk characteristics of a firm. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.
Sample, Data Items, and Descriptive Statistics

Sample
Our sample is drawn from all dividend announcements for firms listed on the New York (NYSE) and American (AMEX) stock exchanges between 1982 and 1993 and have data available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT. The choice of time-period is limited by the requirement that at least four years of data be available before and after the dividend announcement date. To be included in the sample, a dividend announcement must satisfy the following criteria:
(a) The firm's financial data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
(b) The distribution is a quarterly taxable cash dividend, in U.S. dollars.
(c) The shares on which the dividends are paid are ordinary common shares, have not been issued by Americus Trust components, closed-end funds, or REITS.
(d) The previous cash dividend payment was paid within a window of 20 to 90 trading days prior to the current dividend announcement.
(e) The percentage change in dividends is between 12% and 500%. The lower bound of 12%
ensures that we include only economically significant dividend changes and the upper bound of 500% eliminates outliers. In addition, eliminating small dividend changes would also minimize problems arising from mis-specification in the model of expected dividends since large dividend changes are likely to be categorized as dividend surprises regardless of the expectation model employed. The 12% to 500% range is based on an examination of the frequency distribution of all dividend increases and decreases and seems to be the best in terms of including big dividend changes.
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(f) Other non-dividend distribution events such as stock splits, stock dividends, mergers etc. do not occur within 15 trading days surrounding the dividend announcement.
(g) The dividend announcement is not an initiation or an omission.
The resulting sample contains 2,033 dividend increases and 543 dividend decreases for a total of 2,576 announcements.
Data Items and Definitions
For each announcement in the sample, we obtain from CRSP, current and lagged quarterly dividends, stock returns and NYSE/AMEX value-weighted and equal weighted market returns for a three day window (-1 to +1) around the dividend announcement and for a three year period after the dividend announcement. In addition, we obtain stock price and market capitalization at least five days prior to the announcement, and the average daily turnover over a 252-day period prior to the dividend announcement. These variables help us understand the characteristics of dividend increasing and dividend decreasing firms.
From COMPUSTAT, we obtain accounting data for the seven years (-3 to +3)
surrounding the announcement year. Year 0 or the base year is defined to be the fiscal year corresponding to the calendar year of the dividend announcement. For instance, if a dividend (change) announcement took place in calendar year 1990, then the base year for COMPUSTAT data will be fiscal year 1990 regardless of when in 1990 the dividend announcement took place.
The following data items are obtained from COMPUSTAT:
(a) Total Assets, data item (6).
(b) Operating Income before Depreciation (13).
(c) Net Income before Extraordinary Items, data item (18).
(d) Common Dividends, data item (21).
(e) Book Value of Common Equity, data item (60).
(f) Capital Expenditures, data item (128).
The quarterly dividend change corresponding to the dividend announcement is defined as the percentage difference between current quarterly dividends, D i,0 , and the previous quarterly dividends, D i,-1 :
The abnormal stock price reaction to the dividend announcement is defined as the sum of the difference between the stock return and the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX market return:
where r i,t is the return on security 'i' at date 't' and r m,t is the return on the market portfolio 'm' at Following Barber and Lyons (1996) , we use return on assets (ROA) based on operating income before depreciation to measure profitability. 11 The return on assets is defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets:
The unadjusted change in return on assets of firm 'i' is defined as:
If return on assets follows a random walk then the change in ROA represents the innovation in the firm's profitability. We also account for the possibility of an industry drift and calculate the driftadjusted innovation in the firm's profitability (or change in ROA). The industry-adjusted change in return on assets is defined as:
where ROA m,t is the median return on assets for firms (except firm 'i') in the same two-digit SIC code as firm 'i'. The industry performance provides a measure of expected performance.
Therefore, the industry adjusted change in return of assets is a measure of abnormal (excess) change in the performance of the firm.
The capital expenditure ratio of a firm is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to the total assets of the firm: 10 We have repeated all our tests using abnormal returns measured with respect to the equal-weighted index and the results are similar. 
The change in capital expenditure ratio is defined in the same manner as the change in return on assets:
The industry-adjusted change in capital expenditure ratio is defined as:
where CE m,t is the median capital expenditure ratio for firms with the same two-digit SIC code as
The dividend payout ratio is defined as the ratio of common dividends to net income before extraordinary items: Tables 1 and 2 provide preliminary statistics on the percent dividend change, the stock price response to the dividend change, and other characteristics of firms making the dividend announcements. All statistics are provided separately for dividend increases and dividend decreases. Table 1 reports the distribution of dividend changes by calendar year and provides the total dollar amount (in millions of dollars) for all announcements, and the average dollar amount per dividend announcement. Perhaps, the most interesting statistic in Table 1 is the total dollar amount of dividend increases or decreases each calendar year. In spite of the fact that the total number of dividend increases are, on average, about four times the total number of dividend decreases, the total dollar amount of dividend increases and decreases are comparable in magnitude; $7,993.4 million and $7,681.5 million respectively. (These numbers are merely the sums of dividend increases and decreases in the sample and are not inflation adjusted.) Not surprisingly, the average dollar amount per dividend decrease ($15.45 million) is about four times the average dollar amount per dividend increase ($4.3 million). Thus, while a dividend decrease is rarer than a dividend increase, when it does happen it is a much more significant event in terms of the dollar amounts involved. Table 2 reports various characteristics for dividend increasing and decreasing firms. The average increase in dividends is 29.5% and the average three day abnormal return around a dividend increase announcement is 0.84% both of which are statistically significant. The median dividend increasing firm has a market capitalization of $698 million, resides in size decile ten (1 is the smallest, 10 is the largest) among NYSE/AMEX stocks, has a stock price of $30, a relatively high trading volume (a turnover of about 60% per year), and has been in existence for 20 years.
Preliminary Statistics
The quarterly dividend announced by the median firm represents an annualized dividend yield (based on the stock price just before the dividend announcement) of 2.52%. Thus, dividendincreasing firms are fairly large, long-lived, liquid firms.
The average decrease in dividends is around 48% and the average price reaction is -3.47%. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of a dividend decrease is at least one-and-ahalf times that of a dividend increase, and the magnitude of the price reaction to a dividend decrease is about four times that for a dividend increase. To this end, we have also calculated the elasticity of the price reaction to dividend increases and decreases (ELAS) which is defined as the ratio of three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the absolute change in dollar dividends divided by the stock price just before the dividend announcement. Thus, ELAS is a measure of the price impact of dividend change. The price elasticity of dividend increases and decreases for the median firm are quite similar (3.75 and 3.69 respectively), indicating that a one percent change in dividend (either increase or decrease) has a similar price impact.
The median dividend-decreasing firm has a market capitalization of $287.9 million, resides in size decile nine among NYSE/AMEX firms, is fairly high priced, has a relatively high trading volume, and has been in existence for more than 20 years. The quarterly dividends announced by the median dividend-decreasing firm correspond to an annualized dividend yield of 2.86% (based on price just before the dividend announcement). The average market-to-book ratio for dividend increasing and decreasing firms are 1.67 and 1.14 respectively. In comparison, the average M/B ratio for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during 1982-93 (see Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1998) ) is 1.59.
Overall, firms that increase dividends and those that decrease dividends look similar across most characteristics, and seem to be fairly large firms. The main difference is that dividenddecreasing firms have lower stock prices and M/B ratios.
Changes in Risk Characteristics and Future Profitability
The maturity hypothesis provides three main predictions concerning firms that increase or decrease their dividends. (1) The systematic risk of firms should decrease for firms that increase their dividends and increase for firms that decrease their dividends.
(2) Future profitability should decline. (3) The amount invested in the firm's projects should decrease (increase) after a dividend increase (decrease). We will test each one in turn, with particular attention to the relationship between risk changes and dividend changes.
Changes in Risk Characteristics
We measure changes in the systematic risk of equity based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Let 't*' be the month of the dividend announcement. Then for each firm announcing an increase or decrease in dividends, the following monthly 3-factor regression is estimated for months t*-48 to t*+48 (97 monthly observations) around the dividend announcement:
where D t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for t ≥ t* and 0 otherwise. r it is the monthly stock return for firm 'i', r mt is the monthly return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted market portfolio, and r ft is the monthly return on a one-month T-bill obtained from CRSP. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and a 12 For details on how the risk factors are constructed, see Fama and French (1993) .
portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy of small firm risk. HML (High Minus Low) is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks interpreted by Fama and French (1993) as a proxy of earnings distress risk. 13 b -i , s -i , and h -i are the factor loadings (betas) of firm 'i' with respect to (r mt -r ft ), SMB and HML during the three years prior to the dividend announcement and, therefore, represent the systematic risk of the firm before the dividend announcement. b ∆i , s ∆i , and h ∆i represent the difference between the factor loadings after the dividend announcement and the factor loadings before the dividend announcement. They represent the change in systematic risk after the dividend announcement. α -i represents the risk-adjusted abnormal return or alpha of firm 'i' before the dividend announcement and α ∆i is the change in abnormal return after the dividend announcement. Table 3 summarizes results on risk characteristics. Let us first focus on dividend increases. For the entire sample of dividend increases, the market and the SMB betas decline significantly while there is not much change in the HML beta. 14 In addition, firms that increase dividends the most (Quintile 5) experience the largest (mean) decline in the market and the SMB betas. For Quintile 5 firms, the mean market beta declines by 0.08 and the mean SMB beta declines by 0.25.
15 13 There is disagreement over exactly what risk HML proxies for. Fama and French (1993) interpret HML as a proxy of earnings distress risk, i.e., high book-to-market firms face a higher risk of decreasing earnings in the future than do low book-to-market firms. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that HML is a proxy of mis-pricing, i.e., high book-to-market stocks are under-valued stocks while low book-to-market stocks are overvalued stocks and the difference, therefore, is a value premium. We steer clear of this debate and simply treat HML as the return on a statistical "factor" or a benchmark portfolio helpful in explaining the cross-section of expected returns. Higher loading on this "factor" implies higher expected return and lower loading on this "factor" implies lower expected return. Thus, we can still say something about expected returns in the next three to five years without entering the debate on the source of the return premium.
14 In addition, the average HML beta of dividend-increasing firms during the three years prior to the dividend increase is close to zero. This suggests that stocks of dividend increasing firms do not behave like value or glamour stocks. 15 In an auxiliary analysis not reported in the paper, we find that the betas of the Fama and French (1993) threefactor model decline after the announcement of dividend increases and increase after the announcement of
To gauge the economic significance of the decline in risk, we compute the impact on risk premium. The average monthly returns for the market, SMB, and HML factors during 1963 to 1994 are 0.43%, 0.27%, and 0.45% respectively [see Fama and French (1997) ]. Using these numbers, we can compute the decline in risk premium for the portfolio of firms with the largest dividend increase. The decline in risk premium is 0.08×0.43 + 0.25×0.27, which is equal to 0.10% a month or 1.2% a year. (We ignore the HML beta since the change in HML beta is statistically insignificant.) A decline in risk premium of 1.2% per year over a three-year period is economically quite significant and can result in a fairly significant increase in the market value of equity.
Dividend decreasing firms in contrast, experience significant increases in market, SMB, and HML betas. For the entire sample of dividend decreases, the mean market beta increases by 0.07, the mean SMB beta increases by 0.18, and the mean HML beta increases by 0.18. This translates to an increase in risk premium of (0.07×0.43 + 0.18×0.27 + 0.18×0.45) 0.16% per month or approximately 1.9% per year. Thus, while dividend-increasing firms experience a decrease in risk premium of around 1.2% a year, dividend-decreasing firms experience an increase in risk premium of around 1.9% a year. This shows that there are economically significant differences in the way risk premia change after a dividend increase and a dividend decrease.
An examination of the change in alphas indicates that dividend-increasing firms have historically earned a high alpha. The average alpha in the three years prior to the dividend increase is 0.94% a month or 10.4% a year. The average alpha decreases by 0.64% a month or 7.68% a year after the dividend increase. For dividend decreasing firms, on the other hand, the average alpha is -0.55% per month (-6.6% a year) prior to the dividend decrease but increases by 0.35% (4.2% a year) after the dividend decrease. Thus, dividend-increasing firms exhibit positive price momentum and dividend decreasing firms exhibit negative price momentum before the dividend decreases even after adjusting for changes in systematic risk at the industry level. For each firm in the dividend sample, we find a group of firms (control sample) that have the same four-digit SIC code as the firm in the dividend sample. Using this control sample, we calculate an industry-adjusted change in beta (market, SMB, HML), which is equal to the change in beta for a firm announcing an increase or decrease in dividends minus the median change in beta for the firms in the control sample.
dividend announcement. The momentum tends to continue after the dividend announcement.
The difference in average post-announcement alpha between dividend increasing firms and dividend decreasing firms is approximately 6% per year. This is consistent with the post-dividend announcement drift reported in Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997).
Changes in Bond Ratings
If there is a permanent shift in a firm's risk following a (large) dividend change, this change in risk should manifest itself not only through a change in the risk of the equity, but also through a change in the risk of the firm's debt, as measured by a change in debt ratings. The maturity hypothesis predicts that the debt ratings of firms that increase dividends should improve while the debt ratings of firms that decrease their dividends should worsen. Table 4 presents raw and industry-adjusted changes in S&P senior debt ratings for dividend increasing and decreasing firms. As expected, bond ratings decline after dividend decreases and improve after dividend increases. Most of the change takes place from year -1 to year 0, but continue in the same direction after year 0. 16 In addition, bond ratings improve the most for firms with the largest dividend increase (Quintile 5) and the least for firms with the smallest dividend increase (Quintile 1). These results provide further evidence in support of one of the key predictions of the maturity hypothesis; namely, dividend changes should be accompanied by changes in risk in the opposite direction. 16 There is no significant change in the debt-to-equity ratio (both book equity and market equity) of firms that increase their dividends from the three years before to the three years after the dividend change. Thus the reduction in the debt rating or the cost of equity cannot be attributed to a lower debt-to-equity ratio. Table 5 summarizes results regarding changes in future profitability of dividend changing firms. Specifically, the table presents the average annual change in return on assets (ROA) for the three years prior to the dividend change (-3 to -1) and the three years after the dividend change (+1 to +3). The average change is defined as a simple arithmetic average of the changes in each year. The table also presents the change in Year 0, which is the base year (recall that Year 0 is always the fiscal year corresponding to the calendar year of the dividend announcement).
Changes in Future Profitability
The column titled Ld-Lg is the average change in return on assets during years +1 to +3 minus the average change in return on assets during years -3 to -1. The column titled Ld-0 is the average change in return on assets during years +1 to +3 minus the change in return on assets during year 0. Subtracting the average changes in the past from the average changes in the future controls for any drift in the changes and is a way of controlling for expected ROA changes. N represents the number of announcements. The table presents both the mean and the median of unadjusted and industry adjusted changes in return on assets. The industry adjustment provides a further control for expected ROA changes. The significance levels for the means are based on a two-tailed t-test and the significance levels for the medians are based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
We focus on raw, unadjusted numbers in our discussion below since the industry-adjusted results lead to the same conclusions. The median firm announcing dividend increase experiences a significant decline in ROA of 0.46% during the three years after the increase in dividends. Note that this number is not adjusted for industry changes, therefore this is an actual decline in ROA. This is in contrast to an increase of 0.20% experienced during the three years prior to the dividend increase. The median differences for Ld-Lg and Ld-0 are respectively -0.68% and -0.63% both of which are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results show that a dividend-increasing firm transitions from a period of increasing profitability before the dividend increase to a period of declining profitability after the dividend increase. The industry-adjusted results confirm the basic unadjusted results. For dividend decreasing firms, we find the opposite; profitability improves significantly in the three years after the dividend decrease. These firms seem to move from a period of declining profitability before the dividend decrease to a period of improving profitability after the dividend decrease. However, before profitability improves it worsens in the year of the dividend decrease,
i.e., in year 0. The median firm suffers a decline in ROA of -1.63% in year 0 compared to a decline of only 0.94% during the three years prior to the dividend decrease. Yet, in the three years after the dividend decrease, the ROA improves by a healthy 0.68% a year. Not surprisingly, the differences Ld-Lg and Ld-0 are both significant at the 1% level.
The pattern of dividend payout ratios reported in Table 6 provides further insight into the interaction between current dividend changes and future earnings changes. The dividend payout ratio is defined as the ratio of annual dividends on common shares to annual earnings. If cash flow signaling models are correct, the payout ratio of a dividend-increasing firm should increase temporarily at first and then decline gradually over time as earnings start catching up with the increased dividends. For a dividend-decreasing firm, on the other hand, the payout ratio should 17 The quintiles are formed from the pooled time-series, cross-sectional data. We have also formed quintiles by year and then combined the quintiles across years. The results are similar. 18 These results suggest that mis-specification in the model of expected dividends in computing dividend surprises is not likely to confound our results (recall that we use a naï ve expectation model; last quarter' s dividends is the best forecast of this quarter' s dividends). The reason is that large dividend increases (with a median increase of 50%) are likely to be categorized as positive dividend surprises regardless of the expectation model employed. Therefore, we should expect to see correspondingly large improvements in profitability for these firms.
In fact, what we see is large declines in profitability. In addition, our sample selection process which leaves out dividends lower than 12%
should also minimize problems arising from mis-specification in models of expected dividends.
decline first and then increase gradually as earnings decrease. The prediction of the maturity hypothesis is that since future earnings will not increase at the same rate as the dividends (and in fact may even decrease) the payout ratio will increase in the future. In other words, there will be a permanent increase in the dividend payout ratio.
The results in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that the dividend payout ratio increases during the three-year period after a dividend increase. The mean payout ratio for the dividend-increasing firm increases from 38% during years -3 to 0 to 51% during years +1 to +3. Dividend decreasing firms, on the other hand, experience a temporary increase in the dividend payout ratio in year 0, and then see their dividend payout ratio decline in future years. The mean payout ratio of the dividend decreasing firm increases from 75% in years -3 to 1 to 111%% in year 0 and then declines to 68% in years +1 to +3. The results based on medians are similar. The evidence shows that firms increase dividends in order to increase their dividend payout ratio permanently and decrease dividends to respond to recent earnings distress. The pattern of changes in dividend payout ratios from year -3 to +3 (year-by-year) is further highlighted in Figure 1 , which provides a striking visual representation of the results in Table 6 . Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that firms that increase (decrease) dividends experience a decline (an improvement) in return on assets.
Our findings on risk and profitability presented in Tables 3 to 6 focus only on the univariate relationships among dividend changes and future changes in profitability and dividend changes and changes in risk. However, we need to make sure that the relationship between dividend changes and risk changes would hold even after controlling for the changes in profitability. Therefore, we examine the relationship between dividend changes, changes in profitability and systematic risk in a multivariate regression framework. Given our previous findings, we expect large dividend changes to be followed by a large decline in systematic risk and a large decline in return on assets. This gives rise to the following regression:
where:
DIVCHG I = The percentage change in quarterly cash dividend payment.
∆ROA i,0 = Change in raw or industry adjusted after-tax return on assets for year 0.
This is a measure of the abnormal or unexpected change in profitability during the three years after the dividend change.
∆RISK(3) i = An aggregate measure of the change in systematic risk for each firm/event during the three years after the dividend change (described in detail below).
The change in systematic risk is obtained as follows. First, for each dividend announcement in the sample, we compute the change in cost of capital by multiplying the change in market, SMB, and HML betas with the corresponding full time-series average of (r m -r f ), SMB, and HML factors. The change in cost of capital represents a measure of the change in systematic risk. Then we sort the entire sample by the change in cost of capital and form ten portfolios. We compute the mean change in cost of capital for each portfolio and then assign the portfolio mean to each observation in the portfolio. We use this approach to minimize the measurement error problems associated with individual stock betas.
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The regressions are estimated in three different ways: (a) with raw unadjusted changes in return on assets, (b) industry-adjusted changes in return on assets and (c) S&P 500 adjusted changes in return on assets where the benchmark is the return on assets for an equal-weighted portfolio of S&P 500 firms. The regression combines dividend increases and decreases.
19 Using portfolio medians instead of means does not change the results. We have also experimented with an alternate measure of risk changes. The alternate measure is obtained by first ranking the change in market, SMB, and HML betas individually in ascending order and summing the ranks to obtain an ordinal measure of systematic risk. We have also used the market beta alone as one risk measure and a combination of market and the SMB betas as another risk measure. The results using these alternate measures are similar and are available from the authors on request.
The results in Table 7 confirm the positive relationship between dividend changes and current changes in profitability reported by Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (1997) . This shows that dividend changes are a response only to changes in return on assets of the same sign in the same fiscal year (Year 0). In addition, Table 7 reports two new findings: (a) a statistically significant negative relationship between dividend changes and future changes in profitability and (b) a statistically significant negative relationship between dividend changes and future changes in systematic risk (cost of capital). These results confirm the two key predictions of the maturity hypothesis (reported in Tables 3 and 5 in an univariate context), that is dividend changes should be accompanied by changes in profitability and changes in systematic risk of the opposite sign in the future.
Changes in Capital Expenditures
According to the maturity hypothesis, firms that increase dividends should reduce their capital expenditures. This is because mature firms face a declining investment opportunity set and, therefore, do not need to spend as much as they used to on new investments. On the other hand, firms that decrease dividends are likely to decrease capital expenditures during the year accompanying the dividend decrease as a result of recent earnings distress. However, in the future they may or may not increase capital expenditures. Table 8 reports the findings on changes in the capital expenditure ratio (capital expenditures to total assets). Focusing on the industry-adjusted results, we find that firms that increase dividends reduce their capital expenditures significantly by 0.17% relative to the prior three years, and 0.39% relative to year 0. The median reduction is 0.09% and 0.18% (respectively) in the three years following the dividend increase. On the other hand, firms that decrease dividends show a significant decline in capital expenditures in year 0 and no change in years 1 to 3. Thus, after significantly reducing capital expenditures in the year of earnings distress, dividend-decreasing firms do not reduce them further during the three years after the dividend decrease. At the same time they do not show a tendency to increase capital expenditures either. Overall, the pattern of changes in capital expenditures is consistent with the predictions of the maturity hypothesis.
Information Content of Dividend Changes
We showed that there is a strong negative relationship between dividend changes and risk and earnings changes, consistent with the maturity hypothesis. If market participants at least partially recognize these facts, then the initial market reaction to the announced dividend change should be related to the expected changes in earnings and systematic risk. However, the following question still remains. If return on assets declines after a dividend increase, then why does the stock price increase on the announcement of a dividend increase? One possibility is that the positive price reaction is due to the decline in systematic risk/cost of capital. This is the possibility we examine next.
To explore this issue, we regress the announcement period abnormal stock returns on unexpected changes in future profitability and changes in systematic risk. This gives rise to the following regression in which the first two terms on the right-hand side (RHS) represent firmspecific news about future cash flows and the last term represents firm-specific news about cost of capital:
where the terms on the right hand side of equation (11) are defined in the same manner as in equation (10) and CAR i represents the cumulative abnormal return relative to the value-weighted market index from day -1 to +1 surrounding the dividend announcement.
The results from this regression are reported in Table 9 . We find a strong positive relationship between price reaction to dividend changes (CAR) and the current year (Year 0) change in return on assets, and a strong negative relationship between CAR and future changes in return on assets.
In addition, there is a strong negative relationship between CAR and future changes in systematic risk (cost of capital). Thus, a more positive price reaction (to dividend increases) is associated with a larger decline in future profitability and a larger decline in systematic risk.
The negative relation between CAR and future risk changes suggests that greater the expectations of a decline in systematic risk (cost of capital), the more positive is the price reaction. This is intuitive and not surprising: when the cost of capital declines, we would expect firm value to increase. However, the negative relation between CAR and future changes in profitability suggests that controlling for changes in risk, the bigger the expected decline in profitability, the more positive is the price reaction. In other words, the market seems to interpret the expected decline in profitability apparently as good news. How can this result be explained?
One possibility is that investors initially do not recognize that a dividend increase signals a subsequent decline in profitability. Instead, they incorrectly interpret the dividend increase as conveying good news about future cash flows and, consequently, bid the stock price up too much.
In other words, investors' expectation of future earnings is too high subsequent to a dividend increase. One reason for this may be that investors put too much weight on recent increases in profitability and they interpret the dividend increase (incorrectly), on average, as additional confirming signal. The results in Table 5 show that firms that increase dividends the most have indeed experienced the most increase in profitability in the previous three years. The industry adjusted average annual changes in ROA in years -3 to -1 are 0.91% for firms that increase dividends the most, 0.28% for firms that increase dividends the least, and -0.51% for firms that decrease dividends. If investors do tend to be too optimistic (pessimistic) after a dividend increase (decrease) then as investors subsequently learn the truth about declining profitability, they should be negatively surprised, and the stock price should drift downward.
In contrast, the results in Table 3 show that there is a positive drift after a dividend increase and a negative drift after a dividend decrease (the α is positive for the dividend increasing sample and negative for the dividend decreasing sample). However, the drift combines two effects, the effect of declining profitability and the effect of declining risk. In other words, price decreases resulting from investors' earnings expectation errors could be mitigated by price increases resulting from a decrease in cost of capital. Thus, what we see may be the net effect of two forces canceling out each other. This is plausible since the post-dividend announcement drift is smaller in magnitude compared to the post-dividend initiation drift (Michaely, Womack, and
Thaler, 1995) a case where subsequent earnings changes are found to be positive.
In order to investigate the sources of the post dividend-announcement drift we need to estimate the marginal effect of declining profitability on long-term risk-adjusted abnormal returns.
We estimate this marginal effect through the following multiple regression:
where α i is the ex-post risk-adjusted abnormal return for the three year period following the dividend announcement and is obtained from regression equation (9). All other variables are defined as in equation (11).
The results are provided in Table 10 . Now, the slope coefficient corresponding to the future changes in ROA, ∆ROA(3) i , is positive while the slope coefficient corresponding to risk changes is negative. The positive slope corresponding to changes in ROA suggests that controlling for changes in risk, the larger the decline in profitability, the smaller the post-dividend announcement drift. Thus, as investors learn about the decline in profitability following a dividend increase, prices fall, conditionally. One explanation for this result (as discussed earlier) is that investors put too much weight (anchor too much) on recent increases in profitability in forming expectations about future earnings. This over-weighting causes the initial price reaction to a dividend increase, all else equal, to be too high. That is, investors over-react to the news contained in dividends about future earnings changes.
At the same time the evidence suggests that investor underreact to information about risk changes which should lead to a positive drift in prices after a dividend increase and a negative drift in prices after a dividend decrease. As mentioned earlier, the positive drift after a dividend increase combines two effects, the negative effect of declining profitability and the positive effect of decreasing cost of capital. In spite of this, the price drift accompanying a dividend increase is positive and significant. This suggests that the positive effect of declining risk must, on average, be large enough to offset the negative effect of declining profitability.
The above discussion suggests that the positive drift after a dividend increase (decrease) is not due to good (bad) news about profitability. In fact, given that the news about future earnings changes are negative (positive) and that the market does not fully anticipate these negative (positive) earnings changes, we should find that the earnings surprises in the periods after dividend increases (decreases) are negative (positive). We examine this issue by calculating, for each dividend increase and decrease, the abnormal returns and standardize unexpected earnings (SUE) for eight quarters before and eight quarters after (as well as the current quarter) the dividend announcement. 21 If our assertion on the source of the drift is correct, then we should find no significant positive abnormal returns or surprises subsequent to a dividend increase, and no negative surprises or negative abnormal returns following a dividend decrease.
The results of this experiment are reported in Table 11 , Panels A (SUEs) and B (abnormal returns). For dividend decreases, we find negative surprises in each of the eight quarters before the dividend decrease and positive surprises in earnings from the third quarter onward (and highly significant in 5 of the 6 quarters). The earnings surprises for dividend increasing firms are positive before the dividend increase and significantly negative for seven out of eight quarters following the dividend increase. Interestingly, the most negative surprises are for those firms who increased their dividend the most. The results using abnormal returns instead of SUE reveal similar patterns (Panel B): the market reaction to earnings announcements subsequent to a dividend increase suggest that the market is not positively surprised by future earnings and may even be negatively surprised. Overall, the results in Table 11 confirm our assertion that the positive drift in price after a dividend increase is not because of good news about earnings. If anything, the news about earnings is negative. Since the positive or negative drift is not due to good news about future cash flows, the implication of these results, combined with the findings in Table 10 is that the drift is related to changes in systematic risk. 22 In sum, the evidence suggests that the post-dividend 21 When calculating the mean quarterly earnings surprises (SUE), we assume that earnings follow a quarterly seasonal random walk with drift (see Bernard and Thomas, 1990, and Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995) .
SUEs over the past eight quarters are used to compute the drift term and the standard deviation. Abnormal returns are calculated as the four-day cumulative abnormal return around an earnings announcement with the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index as the benchmark. 22 The results in Panel A of Table 11 provide further support for our findings that profitability declines subsequent to a dividend increases (Tables 2 and 3 ). In essence, the results suggest that earnings expectations are too high after a dividend increase and too low after a dividend decrease, which is inconsistent with cash flow signaling models.
announcement drift is related to underreaction to information about risk changes not future profitability.
Conclusion
Dividend increases are a sign of maturity. As firms become mature, their investment opportunity set shrinks, the riskiness of their assets in place may decline, and the number of high growth-high NPV projects (growth options) decreases. These changes have several implications concerning the risk profile, future earnings and investment of the firm: First, they mean that the risk profile of the firm has changed. The firm is now less risky and consequently, its cost of capital is lower. Second, they imply that future earnings or profitability are likely to be lower. Third, they imply that the firm will not need the same level of capital expenditure as before. Finally, as the firm becomes mature, it generates large free cash flows (since it needs less cash for capital expenditures) and the risk of over-investment is more acute. To avoid the agency costs of overinvestment, the firm's managers may decide to distribute the excess cash in the form of higher dividends.
The results in this paper indicate the following. First, announcements of dividend increase convey information about a decrease in the systematic risk of the firm and a decrease in future profitability. Second, the market reacts positively to a dividend increase, despite the subsequent decline in earnings, because it conveys information about a reduction in risk and perhaps because it reduces free cash flows and the agency costs of free cash flows. Third, a dividend increase also conveys information about the investment opportunity set the firm faces: we document a significant reduction in capital expenditure in the years following a dividend increase. Overall, our findings are consistent with firms' behavior in which a permanent shift in investment opportunities and risk profile has an impact on their financial policies. The information that arrives about future earnings has the opposite effect on the drift. On average investors seem to overestimate future earnings following a dividend increase event (the converse is true for dividend decreases). We show that earnings are significantly below expectations for seven out of the eight quarters following a dividend increase event, and that when holding risk changes constant, the reduction in earnings have a negative impact on the drift.
Thus, the upward drift for dividend increasing firms is due to reduction in their systematic risk that have not been realized by the market at the time the dividend change was announced. It is interesting to compare our results for dividend increasing firms to those for dividend initiating firms. Unlike dividend increasing firms, future earnings surprises for dividend initiating firms are positive (Healy and Palepu, 1988 and Michaely et al., 1995) . This difference may explain why the drift for initiating firms is larger than for dividend increasing firms
We have extensively documented the relationship between dividend changes and risk, earnings and capital expenditure changes and found them consistent with the maturity hypothesis.
But the maturity hypothesis has also implications relating the level of dividend payout (in addition to the change) to ex-ante firm characteristics. Specifically, if firms increase their level of dividends as they become mature, we should expect to see firms that are low growth, cash rich and with low level of capital expenditures to pay a higher level of dividends than growth firms. Indeed it is usually the more stable, low growth and less risky firms (like utilities for example) who pay more dividends compared to more risky, high growth firms who spend more on capital expenditures (like firms in the high-tech industry).
Finally, it is important to note that the results in this paper do not rule out a role for dividends as an information device, but just that the dimensionality of the problem is richer than what the standard models imply. For instance, the market could interpret a dividend increase as conveying information about risk, earnings and management commitment not to squander shareholder's wealth in the face of declining investment opportunities. In other words, large dividend increases convey information that the firm has matured. Overall, the evidence in this paper shows that changes in dividend policy and their effects on the corporation are more complex than recognized in the theoretical literature. However, the evidence also suggests possible avenues for developing a more complete theory of dividend policy.
Table 1 Cash Dividend Changes by Calendar Year
This panel reports the distribution by calendar year of a sample of cash dividend changes announced over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . To be included in the sample, the observation must satisfy the following criteria: 1) the firm's financial data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, 2) the cash dividend announcement is not accompanied by other non-dividend events, 3) only quarterly cash dividends are considered, 4) cash dividends changes only in the range 12% to 500% are included, 5) cash dividend initiations and omissions are excluded, 6) the last cash dividend payment was paid within 90 days prior to the announcement of the cash dividend change. 
Table 2 Firm Characteristics
This table reports the firm characteristics of a sample of firms that change their cash dividends over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . CHGDIV is the percentage change in the cash dividend payment, CAR is the three-day cumulative NYSE/AMEX value-weighted abnormal return around the dividend announcement, ELAS is the CAR divided by the change in the dividend yield, SIZE is the market value of equity at the time of the announcement of the cash dividend change, RSIZE is the size decile ranking relative to the entire sample of firms on CRSP, PRICE is the average price, TOVR is the average daily turnover over a 253-day period prior to the dividend announcement in %, M/B is the market-to-book ratio just at the time of the announcement, DY is the dividend yield at the time of the announcement of the cash dividend change, and IYREXST is the number of years that the firm has been on CRSP. 
where r it is the monthly return on stock i , r ft is the monthly return on 1-month U.S. Treasury bills, r mt is the monthly return on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index, SMB t is the difference between the monthly return on a portfolio of small firms and the monthly return on a portfolio of large firms, HML t is the difference between the monthly return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the monthly return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, and D t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if t ≥ t*, where t* is the month in which the dividend change was announced. b -i , s -i , and h -i are the factor loadings (betas) of firm 'i' during the three years prior to the dividend announcement and b ∆i , s ∆i , and h ∆i are the difference between the factor loadings after the dividend announcement and the factor loadings before the dividend announcement. α -i is the abnormal return or Jensen's Alpha of firm 'i' before the dividend announcement and α ∆i is the change in abnormal return after the dividend announcement. Each cross-sectional sample of regression coefficients is winsorized at the first and 99 th percentiles. The significance levels of the means (medians) are based on a two-tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test). *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports changes in S&P senior debt ratings for dividend increasing and decreasing firms. The letter bond ratings are converted to numeric ratings as follows: AAA=3, AA+=4, AA=5, AA-=6, A+=7, A=8, A-=9, BBB+=10, BBB=11, BBB-=12, BB+=13, BB=14, BB-=15, B+=16, B=17, B-=18, CCC+=19, CCC=20, CCC-=21, CC=22, C=23, CI=24, and D=25. The mean numeric ratings from years -1 to +3 around the dividend announcement year are reported for each dividend change portfolio. Ld-Lg represents the difference between average ratings during years +1 to +3 and year -1. Ld-0 represents the difference between the average ratings in years +1 to +3 and year 0. The significance levels of the means are based a two-tailed t-test. The data on bond ratings are available in COMPUSTAT only from 1985. Unadjusted refers to unadjusted raw bond ratings, while Industry Adjusted refers to unadjusted ratings minus the median rating of firms in the same two-digit SIC code. N reports the number of dividend announcements. *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Regression
Table 5 Change in Return on Assets
This table reports the annual change in return on assets (ROA) based on operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT annual item #13) for a sample of firms that change their dividends over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . The industry-adjusted annual change in return on assets is equal to unadjusted change minus the median change for firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. See equations (3), (4), and (5) in the text for further details. Year 0 is the year in which the dividend change was announced. The data have been winsorized at the first and 99 th percentiles. The column titled Ld-Lg is the average change in ROA during years +1 to +3 minus the average change in ROA during years -3 to -1. The column titled Ld-0 is the average change in ROA during years +1 to +3 minus the change in ROA during year 0. N represents the number of dividend announcements. The significance levels of the means (medians) are based on a two-tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test). *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dividend Changes
Unadjusted Industry Adjusted Divchg CAR -3 to -1 0 +1 to +3 Ld -Lg Ld -0 -3 to -1 0 +1 to +3 Ld -Lg Ld -0 [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . The dividend payout ratio is defined as common dividends (COMPUSTAT annual item #21) divided by the earnings before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT annual item #18). Firms with negative earnings before extraordinary items are excluded from the sample. The industry-adjusted payout ratio is equal to unadjusted payout ratio minus the median payout ratio of all the firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. Year 0 is the year in which the dividend change was announced. The data have been winsorized at the first and 99 th percentiles. The significance levels of the means (medians) are based on a two-tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test). *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend Increases
where DIVCHG is the percentage change in the cash dividend payment, ∆ROA i,0 is the annual change in return on assets during the year of the announcement of the cash dividend change, ∆ROA(3) i is defined as (ROA 3 +ROA 2 +ROA 1 )/3 -(ROA -3 +ROA -2 +ROA -1 )/3 and is a measure of the abnormal or unexpected change in return on assets during the three years after the dividend change., RISK(3) i is an increasing function of the change in risk after the announcement of the dividend change. The regression combines dividend increases and decreases. The first column Unadjusted reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the unadjusted annual change in return on assets. The second column Industry reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the industry-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the median annual change in return on assets for firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. The third column S&P 500 reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the S&P 500-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the annual change in return on assets of the firms on the S&P 500 index. The significance levels of the estimated coefficients are based on a two-tailed ttest. *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. White heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Table 8 Annual Change in Capital Expenditures
This table reports the annual change in capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item # 128) relative to total assets (COMPUSTAT item # 6) for a sample of firms that change their dividends over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . The industry-adjusted annual change in capital expenditures relative to total assets is equal to unadjusted annual change in capital expenditures relative to total assets minus the median annual change in capital expenditures relative to total assets of all the firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. Year 0 is the year in which the dividend change was announced. The data have been winsorized at the first and 99 th percentiles. The column titled Ld-Lg is the average change in capital expenditures during years +1 to +3 minus the average change in capital expenditures during years -3 to -1. The column titled Ld-0 is the average change in capital expenditures during years +1 to +3 minus the average change in capital expenditures during year 0. N represents the number of dividend announcements. The significance levels of the means (medians) are based on a two-tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test). *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
where CAR i is the three-day cumulative abnormal return in percent with respect to the NYSE/AMEX value-weighted index around the dividend announcement, ∆ROA i,0 is the annual change in return on assets during the year of the announcement of the cash dividend change, ∆ROA(3) i is defined as (ROA 3 +ROA 2 +ROA 1 )/3 -(ROA -3 +ROA -2 +ROA -1 )/3 and is a measure of the abnormal or unexpected change in return on assets during the three years after the dividend change., RISK(3) i is an increasing function of the change in risk after the announcement of the dividend change. The regression combines dividend increases and decreases. The first column Unadjusted reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the unadjusted annual change in return on assets. The second column Industry reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the industry-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the median annual change in return on assets for firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. The third column S&P 500 reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the S&P 500-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the annual change in return on assets of the firms on the S&P 500 index. The significance levels of the estimated coefficients are based on a two-tailed t-test. *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. White heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
where α i is the three-year ex-post risk-adjusted abnormal return in % for the three-years after the announcement of the dividend change. It is computed from the three-factor model described in Table 5 . ∆ROA i,0 is the annual change in return on assets during the year of the announcement of the cash dividend change, ∆ROA(3) i is defined as (ROA 3 +ROA 2 +ROA 1 )/3 -(ROA -3 +ROA -2 +ROA -1 )/3 and is a measure of the abnormal or unexpected change in return on assets during the three years after the dividend change., RISK(3) i is an increasing function of the change in risk after the announcement of the dividend change. The regression combines dividend increases and decreases. The first column Unadjusted reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the unadjusted annual change in return on assets. The second column Industry reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the industry-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the median annual change in return on assets for firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the dividend changing firm. The third column S&P 500 reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model using the S&P 500-adjusted annual change in return on assets, which is equal to the unadjusted annual change in return on assets minus the annual change in return on assets of the firms on the S&P 500 index. The significance levels of the estimated coefficients are based on a two-tailed t-test. *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. White heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. This table reports mean quarterly earnings surprises referred to as standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and four-day (from day -2 to day +1) cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) in percent around quarterly earnings announcement dates for dividend increases and decreases. The returns and SUEs are reported for eight quarters before and eight quarters after the most recent earnings announcement falling on or before the dividend announcement month. The SUEs are computed based on a quarterly seasonal random walk with a drift. SUEs over the past eight quarters are used to compute the drift term and the standard deviation. The NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index is used as the benchmark in computing the CAR. The sample time period is 1982-1993 and contains 2,033 dividend increases and 543 dividend decreases. The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics. 0 represents the most recent quarterly announcement on or before the month in which the dividend was announced. Quarters prior to the most recent quarter are represented as -k while quarters after the most recent quarter are represented as +k, where k=1 to 8. This figure plots the annual mean dividend payout ratios of dividend increasing and dividend decreasing firms for a six-year period (-3 to +3) surrounding the dividend announcement year. The dividend payout ratio is defined as common dividends paid by a firm in a given fiscal year divided by its net income before extraordinary items for the same fiscal year. The sample involves firms that changed dividends by more than 12% but less than 500% and covers the time period 1982-1993. 
Regression
